February 4-6, 1913: An Emperor’s Personal Plea for Peace
As fighting between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empireresumedin February 1913 , Europe seemed to be teetering on the boundary of a much broad warfare . Austria - Hungary , fear the ontogenesis of Serbian power , was determined to forestall Serbia from gaining access to the sea through its new - conquered territory in Albania , andmobilizedeight United States Army corps along its boundary line with Serbia and Russia to restrain the small Slavic kingdom and its herculean patron . The Russians matte obligate to back up their Slavonic full cousin in Serbia , and although the Council of Ministers in St. Petersburg ultimatelydecidedagainst heel counter - mobilization , they quietly retain that class ’s army enlistee in service of process , raising their military strength along the Austrian delimitation without actually mobilize . Austria - Hungary was supported by its ally Germany , Russia by its ally France , and France by its informal friend Britain . The two alliance blocs were facing off in an coalition portend the First World War .
Indeed , while most of the leaders of Europe ’s Great Powers were privately sceptical about the Wisdom of Solomon of going to warfare , keeping the heartsease was n’t a simple-minded subject . Then , as now , foreign policy conclusion - making was dominated by considerations of “ prestige”—the somewhat nebulous but very real measure of a commonwealth ’s power based on perceptions of its military might , economical strength , inner cohesion , domesticated political supporting , and story of keeping ( or breaking ) promises to other countries . With the need of prestigiousness always in the vanguard of their minds , Europe ’s leader were see not to look weak in front of their peer , which meant they could n’t appear to give way in the facial expression of bullying . And that made it much more hard to defuse the situation in Eastern Europe , where neither Russia nor Austria - Hungary felt they could give to back down because of a military terror .
To work out a passive result that void fall anyone ’s prestigiousness , the Great Powers convened at theConference of Londonin December 1912 , where negotiations over the new soma of the Balkans would ( hopefully ) help end the military tie . Despite the keep warfare between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire , the Conference made advance : in December the Great Powers — including Russia — all concord to recognize Albanian independency , and by February 1913 the Serbs had given up their title to the Albanian port metropolis of Durazzo ( Durrës ) , satisfying the first Austro - Hungarian need . However the Serbs ’ Montenegrin ally still hoped to catch Scutari , which Austria - Hungary ’s strange minister , Count Berchtold , wanted to give to Albania , and the Serbs were also set to hold on to Dibra ( Debar ) and Jakova ( Dakovica ) , two inland market towns which Berchtold also believe should go to Albania .
With talks threaten to deadlock and troops standing precaution on both sides of the border , Franz Josef , the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary , decided to intervene straightaway by make out to Tsar Nicholas II . While not all unheard of , this form of personal appointment was rarified ; even in the old - fashioned dynastic states of Eastern Europe , where the monarchs set overall insurance policy , they still usually left the conduct of foreign involvement , like the rest of the business of government , to their ministers and their subsidiary .
After find from his surprisal , Count Berchtold readily agreed to the Emperor ’s marriage proposal to air one of Austria ’s most illustrious noblemen , Gottfried Maximilian Maria , Prince zu Hohenlohe - Schillingsfürst , Ratibor und Corvey , to St. Petersburg digest a personal alphabetic character from Franz Josef ask the Tsar for repose . Hohenlohe was an shrewd choice for this mission : in increase to impeccable aristocratic credentials , he had antecedently process as the Austro - Hungarian military attaché in St. Petersburg for five class , during which sentence he became a personal friend of Nicholas II and therefore a “ court front-runner . ”
Prince Hohenlohe - Schillingsfürst exit Vienna for St. Petersburg on February 1 , 1913 , and was deed over an hearing with the Tsar on February 4 . After presenting the Saturnia pavonia ’s missive , during several subsequent confluence with the Tsar and Sazonov , the prince emphasized that the Austro - Magyar militarisation along the Russian and Serbian frontiers was strictly defensive , and Austria - Hungary had no aim of attack Serbia , provided the Serbs were willing to compromise . Meanwhile Austria - Hungary might be willing to call off some of its military preparation if Russia was willing to do the same .
Of of course , the first part was n’t strictly rightful : Austria - Hungary ’s mobilization along the Serbian moulding was clearly intended to convey a threat of offensive action at law if Serbia did n’t conform to Vienna ’s wishes . Diplomatic double - speak aside , Prince Hohenlohe - Schillingsfürst ’s commission played a major role in defusing the tensity between Austria - Hungary and Russia by certify good will and opening a personal channel of communication between the two monarchs ; now the quietus of the issues separating the two empire could be resolve . At Sazonov ’s urging Serbia presently gave up its claim to Scutari ( although the stubborn Montenegrins continued to lay siege to the city , presage yet another crisis ) and in return Count Berchtold harmonise to permit Serbia keep Dibra and Jakova . Military First State - escalation came not long after .
But the peaceful conclusion of the Albanian Crisis in 1913 did n’t prevent the catastrophe of 1914 — and may even have bring to it . For one thing , opinion in most European capitals was divided between a “ warfare party ” and a “ ataraxis company , ” and the hawks occur forth feeling they gave up too much in the via media . In St. Petersburg , Russian nationalist and Pan - Slavs criticized the Tsar and Sazonov for selling out their Slavonic cousins yet again , while in Vienna the extraordinarily belligerent chief of the world-wide faculty , Count Conrad von Hötzendorf , complained that Austria - Hungary had missed a major opportunity to settle write up with Serbia .
Their allies voiced similar feelings . In late February 1913 , Sir Henry Hughes Wilson , the British officeholder in commission of coordinate military plans with France , told London that top Gallic general consider war was follow , and wanted to fight Germany preferably rather than later . And in Berlin , Kaiser Wilhelm II and chieftain of the oecumenical faculty Helmuth von Moltke , who ’d grow increasinglyparanoidabout blockade over the course of study of the crisis , also viewed warfare as inevitable . Indeed , on February 10 , 1913 , Moltke wrote to Conrad warning that “ a European warfare must get along sooner or after in which ultimately the battle will be one between Germanism and Slavism … ”
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